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Abstract
Interpretation biases have long been theorized to play a central role in depression. Yet, the 
strength of the empirical evidence for this bias remains a topic of debate. This meta-analysis 
aimed to estimate the overall effect size and to identify moderators relevant to theory and 
methodology. PsycINFO, Embase, Web of Science, Scopus, PubMed, and dissertation 
databases were searched. A random-effects meta-analysis was performed on 87 studies 
(N=9,443). Results revealed a medium overall effect size (g=0.72, 95%-CI:[0.62;0.82]). 
Equivalent effect sizes were observed for patients diagnosed with clinical depression (g=0.60, 
95%-CI:[0.37;0.75]), patients remitted from depression (g=0.59, 95%-CI:[0.33;0.86]), and 
undiagnosed individuals reporting elevated depressive symptoms (g=0.66, 95%-
CI:[0.47;0.84]). The effect size was larger for self-referential stimuli (g=0.90, 95%-
CI[0.78;1.01]), but was not modified by the presence (g=0.74, 95%-CI[0.59;0.90]) or absence 
(g=0.72, 95%-CI[0.58;0.85]) of mental imagery instructions. Similar effect sizes were observed 
for a negative interpretation bias (g=0.58, 95%-CI:[0.40;0.75]) and lack of a positive 
interpretation bias (g=0.60, 95%-CI:[0.36;0.85]). The effect size was only significant when 
interpretation bias was measured directly (g=0.88, 95%-CI[0.77;0.99]), but not when measured 
indirectly (g=0.04, 95%-CI[-0.14;0.22]). It is concluded that depression is associated with 
interpretation biases, but caution is necessary because methodological factors shape 
conclusions. Implications and recommendations for future research are outlined.
Keywords: Interpretation bias; Cognitive bias; Depression; Meta-analysis; Review.
INTERPRETATION BIASES IN DEPRESSION 3
Introduction
Depression is one of the most common psychiatric disorders causing a severe personal 
and societal burden. The global point prevalence rate of depression is estimated at 4.7% and the 
annual incidence at 3.0% (Ferrari et al., 2013), with about 350 million people currently suffering 
from this disorder worldwide (WHO, 2012). In addition to its high prevalence, depression is 
marked by severe symptomatic suffering, impaired social and professional functioning, 
substantial loss of quality of life, as well as increased risk of suicide (Kessler & Bromet, 2013). 
The economic costs to society are estimated at a total of $83.1 billion a year in medical costs, 
suicide-related mortality costs, and workplace costs (Greenberg, Fournier, Sisitsky, Pike, & 
Kessler, 2015). These facts clearly demonstrate that depression represents a major public health 
concern. Efforts to identify the factors involved in the onset and maintenance of depression are 
therefore particularly important to better understand and treat this devastating disorder.
The past several decades have witnessed burgeoning research on cognitive factors 
involved in depression (Gotlib & Joormann, 2010; Mathews & Macleod, 2005). This line of 
research represents one of the most important and direct translations of cognitive science to 
uncover emotionally distorted cognitive processes that put people at risk to develop and/or 
maintain depressive symptoms. In particular, one important line of research has investigated 
depression-linked abnormalities in how people interpret ambiguous emotional information.
Ambiguity is commonly encountered in everyday life. Imagine, for example, a person 
in the audience frowning his eyebrows while you are giving a speech or imagine that you were 
not invited to a party while several of your friends are going. These events are ambiguous 
because they can be understood in multiple ways (e.g., think about how these situations may 
turn out for you or how others may think of you). People need to interpret such ambiguous 
information to make sense of what is happening to them. Interpretation is a semantic process 
through which people construct mental representations that resolve the ambiguity (Blanchette 
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& Richards, 2010; Hirsch, Meeten, Krahé, & Reeder, 2016). In depression, the process of 
interpretation is theorized to be marked by systematic emotional biases known as interpretation 
biases. Specifically, cognitive theorists have hypothesized that individuals with elevated 
depression levels have a tendency to create more negative and fewer positive meanings to 
explain ambiguous information (Clark, Beck, & Alford, 1999; Ingram, Miranda, & Segal, 
1999). Importantly, interpretation biases are typically regarded as proximal cognitive causes of 
depression and not as some mood-dependent correlates (Beck & Haigh, 2014; Ingram et al., 
1999). Therefore, interpretation biases are a primary target in many psychological treatments 
for depression (Berking, Ebert, Cuijpers, & Hofmann, 2013; Clark et al., 1999) and cognitive 
training methodologies (Cristea, Kok, & Cuijpers, 2015; Menne-Lothmann et al., 2014).
Prior Reviews and Research
The theoretical prediction that depression is linked to interpretation biases has generated 
a wealth of empirical scrutiny in the past four decades. Cross-sectional and longitudinal studies 
have employed a wide variety of interpretation bias paradigms in diverse adult populations 
including patients diagnosed with major depression, undiagnosed individuals with elevated 
self-reported depressive symptoms, and patients remitted from depression (Blanchette & 
Richards, 2010; Foland-Ross & Gotlib, 2012; Gotlib & Joormann, 2010; Mathews & Macleod, 
2005; Wisco, 2009). Although the theoretical predictions are straightforward, the empirical data 
has been far less clear-cut. In interpreting the available data, some narrative reviews have 
concluded that a considerable number of studies have yielded evidence for interpretation biases 
in depression and provide substantial support for predictions by cognitive models (Mathews & 
Macleod, 2005; Wisco, 2009). In contrast, other reviews have emphasized inconsistencies in 
research findings and pointed out that much of the evidence base is plagued by confounding 
factors even to the extent that there is limited direct support for the hypotheses (Blanchette & 
Richards, 2010; Foland-Ross & Gotlib, 2012; Gotlib & Joormann, 2010). In light of these 
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different opinions and recent research that has produced mixed findings (e.g., Beard, Rifkin, & 
Björgvinsson, 2017; Cowden Hindash & Rottenberg, 2015; Käse et al., 2013; Moser, Huppert, 
Foa, & Simons, 2012; Normansell & Wisco, 2016; Sears, Suzie Bisson, & Nielsen, 2011), the 
strength of support for interpretation biases in depression remains a topic of scientific debate.
To date, it has yet to be quantified which factors derived from theory and research 
methodology contribute to the variability in research findings. Interpretation biases in 
depression have only been subjected to meta-analysis indirectly, as part of a meta-analysis on 
implicit processes in depression (Phillips, Hine, & Thorsteinsson, 2010). While this meta-
analysis offered some support for the relation between interpretation biases and depression, the 
study focused on a small subset of relevant work in this area and did not aim to explore 
methodological or theoretical factors that may moderate this relationship. The field clearly lacks 
a comprehensive meta-analysis that synthesizes prior research findings on interpretation biases 
in depression. In an attempt to address this gap in the literature, this study aims (a) to estimate 
the magnitude of the overall effect size and (b) to explore whether effect sizes vary as a function 
of several key theoretical or methodological factors.
Theoretical models of interpretation biases in depression
To contextualize the variables of interest to this meta-analysis, this section briefly 
outlines several influential cognitive models of depression that have guided research on 
interpretation biases.
One of the most prevailing cognitive models is Beck’s schema theory (Beck & Haigh, 
2014; Clark et al., 1999). This theory asserts that individuals who are vulnerable to depression 
hold latent negative schemas or memory representations that contain negative self-referent 
beliefs on themes of loss and failure. Negative schemas develop through interactions between 
cognitive processes and adverse environmental factors. When activated by stressful life events, 
negative schemas guide how individuals process and interpret information. Vulnerable and 
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depressed individuals are theorized to selectively attend to negative cues in their environment 
and recall related negative experiences. These negative biases in attention and memory skew 
the integration of information and produce a stream of more negative and fewer positive 
interpretations. Such interpretation biases reinforce negative schemas and memories, instigating 
a vicious cycle of negative thinking and worsening of depressive mood.
Drawing on Bower’s network theory (Bower, 1981), Ingram (1984) proposed an 
information-processing analysis in which interpretations play a central role in self-perpetuating 
circles of negative thought in depression. The theory assumes that interpretations of life events 
activate memory networks. These memory networks consist of a number of interconnected 
nodes containing specific sets of cognitions. It is assumed that the activation of specific nodes 
spreads to all other connected nodes within a certain memory network and all its related 
networks. This causes individuals to elaborate upon cognitions that are congruent with their 
initial interpretations, which in turn activate other related negative cognitions. The process of 
recycling negative interpretations through various memory networks is thought to heighten 
vulnerability to depression. Once negative interpretations are more frequently made, they can 
more easily trigger extensive elaboration on related negative topics and themes. Ingram’s theory 
asserts that the biased elaboration on negative interpretation is a vulnerability factor that 
endures beyond the depressive episode.
Recent models of depression increasingly emphasize the role of mental imagery during 
emotional information-processing. While ambiguity can be resolved verbally, it can also be 
resolved through mental imagery. Holmes and colleagues (Holmes, Lang, & Deeprose, 2009) 
formulated a model of depression that focuses on the interaction between mental imagery and 
interpretation bias. The model proposes that interpretation biases and mental imagery have 
particularly toxic effects on depressed mood when these factors interact. It is hypothesized that 
making a negative interpretation and subsequently mentally simulating it amplify depressed 
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mood more than verbal interpretations of the same situation. The mental images constructed 
may in turn be interpreted negatively and increase depressive mood. In addition to negative 
mental images, the lack of positive mental imagery in depression may further contribute to the 
depressed mood. This is because it prevents formation of more positive images that can 
motivate goal-directed behavior. Mental imagery may thus be a critical factor that aggravates 
the impact of interpretation biases on depressive symptoms.
Moderating variables derived from theoretical models
Theoretical models converge on the hypothesis that depression is marked by 
interpretation biases. These models also propose a number of factors that influence the 
magnitude of the emotional bias in interpretation. Below, we focus on the clinical status of 
depression, the centrality of self-relevant stimuli, and the use of mental imagery.1
Clinical status of depression
Theories of depression predict that the magnitude of interpretation biases differs across 
depression groups (Beck & Haigh, 2014; Clark et al., 1999; Ingram, 1984). In researching this 
hypothesis, studies have recruited samples of patients with diagnosed major depression, 
undiagnosed individuals with self-reported elevated levels of depressive symptoms, and 
patients remitted from major depression (Blanchette & Richards, 2010; Foland-Ross & Gotlib, 
2012; Gotlib & Joormann, 2010; Mathews & Macleod, 2005; Wisco, 2009). In the face of more 
severe and impairing symptoms, theorists have argued that clinical depression is qualitatively 
different from subclinical symptom levels of depression (Ingram & Siegle, 2009). Hence, 
patients with diagnosed major depression are expected to display more severe interpretation 
biases than undiagnosed individuals with elevated depressive symptoms. Moreover, theoretical 
models predict that biased elaboration of negative interpretations is a vulnerability factor that 
1 Cognitive models often make differential predictions regarding the levels of automaticity at which interpretation 
biases occur. This factor was not considered here because there is currently no consensus about the boundaries of 
‘automatic’ (i.e., quick, effortless, unconscious) and ‘controlled’ (i.e., slow, effortful, conscious) interpretations. 
In addition, interpretation tasks are generally not able to unambiguously disentangle these types of interpretations.
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endures beyond the depressive episode (Ingram, 1984). Therefore, individuals remitted from 
depression are expected to display an interpretation bias. However, this bias in remitted 
depression may represent either a stable process that operates continuously or a latent process 
that is activated by stress or negative mood (Just, Abramson, & Alloy, 2001). To date, it is 
unclear whether there are differences in the magnitude of interpretation bias between depression 
groups with a different clinical status.
Centrality of self-relevance
Depression-linked interpretation biases are assumed to be triggered by self-relevant 
information related to depressed people’s negative schemas (Clark et al., 1999) or depressive 
memory networks (Ingram, 1984). While a direct test of this theoretical prediction requires 
ideographically relevant experimental stimuli, studies have utilized standardized self-referent 
information as a proxy of idiographic relevance. Self-referential stimuli make reference to the 
respondent’s own character and his/her experience. Though prior work has suggested that 
interpretation biases mainly occur for self-referent stimuli (Wisco, 2009), research is 
inconclusive as to whether interpretation biases are elicited only in response to this type of 
stimuli. For example, some investigators have observed an interpretation bias for specific other-
referent stimuli (e.g., Wisco & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2010), whereas other researchers reported no 
such evidence (Cowden Hindash & Rottenberg, 2017). Given the centrality of self-relevance in 
cognitive theories, it is important to determine whether self-referential stimuli elicit an 
interpretation bias and if this bias can be elicited by stimuli that are not self-referent.
The use of mental imagery
In line with theories stipulating that mental imagery exacerbates interpretation bias in 
depression (Holmes et al., 2009), studies on interpretation biases have sometimes explicitly 
instructed participants to use mental imagery to resolve the ambiguous stimuli. The task 
instructions typically prompt participants to imagine the described situation and its outcome or 
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to elaborate on images evoked by the presented stimulus materials including themselves as a 
central actor, that is a first-person perspective. To date, it remains unclear to what extent mental 
imagery instructions affect the relation between interpretation biases and depression. Prior 
research has generally produced mixed findings. For example, even when identical paradigms 
were employed with instructions to use mental imagery, some studies did observe evidence for 
depression-linked interpretation biases (Lawson, MacLeod, & Hammond, 2002) whereas others 
did not (Käse et al., 2013). For both theoretical and methodological reasons, it is important to 
clarify whether instructing participants to create mental images to disambiguate the emotional 
information alters the strength of the relation between interpretation biases and depression.
Methodological considerations and moderators
In addition to moderators related to theory, investigators have repeatedly argued that the 
diversity in methods contributes to the variability in research findings (Blanchette & Richards, 
2010; Foland-Ross & Gotlib, 2012). Indeed, studies on interpretation biases differ in how 
interpretation bias is measured and quantified in bias scores.2
Measurement method
Investigators have used direct and indirect measurement methods to study interpretation 
biases. Direct measurement involves methods that require respondents to report the emotional 
tone of their interpretation(s) in response to the stimuli presented. Examples of direct methods 
are interpretation tasks that ask respondents to report the interpretations they have constructed 
(Berna, Lang, Goodwin, & Holmes, 2011; Wisco & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2010) or to rank 
interpretations according to their plausibility (Butler & Mathews, 1983). Importantly, direct 
methods are not restricted to questionnaires. Direct measurement of the emotional content of 
2 A variety of paradigms have been employed to study interpretation biases (for a recent overview, see Hirsch et 
al., 2016). These paradigms likely tap different aspects of interpretation bias and the type of paradigm may be a 
potential moderator of the relation between interpretation bias and depression. The type of paradigm was not 
considered as a moderator in this meta-analysis because the field lacks consensus regarding appropriate categories 
of paradigms and which aspects of interpretation bias they measure.
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interpretations is an important feature of many cognitive-experimental paradigms. For example, 
in the homograph task (Holmes, Lang, Moulds, & Steele, 2008) or scrambled sentences task 
(Wenzlaff & Bates, 1998), respondents describe the first mental image or thought that comes 
to mind. The advantage of direct methods is that they have higher face validity because they 
assess the content of emotional interpretations. This is information only respondents know. The 
major weakness is that direct methods are prone to response biases and demand characteristics 
(Blanchette & Richards, 2010). This means that depressed individuals may preferentially 
endorse more negative interpretations, but that other factors than interpretation biases drive 
these effects (Blanchette & Richards, 2010; Gotlib & Joormann, 2010).
To minimize problems inherent to direct measurement methods, researchers have 
developed indirect measures. Indirect measures do not require respondents to describe or 
evaluate the content of their emotional interpretations. Instead, these measures rely on 
differential behavioral or psychophysiological responses to emotional interpretations. 
Examples of indirect measures include reaction times (Mogg, Bradbury, & Bradley, 2006; Sears 
et al., 2011), startle responses (Käse et al., 2013; Lawson et al., 2002), and event-related 
potentials (Moser et al., 2012). Indirect methods are mostly employed by cognitive-
experimental paradigms. For instance, in the word-sentence association paradigm (Cowden 
Hindash & Rottenberg, 2017), respondents judge the relatedness between pairs of words (e.g., 
‘embarrassing’, ‘funny’) and ambiguous sentences (e.g., ‘people laugh after something you 
said’) that are presented for short durations (e.g., 500 ms). The task records reaction times (RT) 
to endorse or reject the matched word-sentence pairs to infer interpretation bias. Evidence for 
an interpretation bias is inferred when faster RTs are found for endorsed negative word-
sentence pairs compared to positive word-sentence pairs. The advantage of indirect measures 
is that they reduce the influence of potential response strategies on interpretation bias. The 
disadvantage is that they have lower face validity.
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To date, many studies in support of depression-linked interpretation biases have 
employed methods that directly measure interpretations, whereas the findings from studies with 
indirect measures have been mixed (Blanchette & Richards, 2010; Foland-Ross & Gotlib, 2012; 
Gotlib & Joormann, 2010). Thus, examining the role of the measurement method as a moderator 
is of critical importance to determine whether methodological factors shape the conclusions 
regarding the relation between interpretation bias and depression.
Interpretation bias scores
Studies have computed both absolute and relative bias scores to represent depression-
linked biases in interpretation. Absolute bias scores are based on the recorded responses for 
each of the possible interpretations. For example, absolute bias scores may include the number 
of negative or positive interpretations reported (e.g., Halberstadt et al., 2008) or the reaction 
times on trials indexing positive, neutral, or negative interpretations (e.g., Bisson & Sears, 
2007). Other studies have calculated relative bias scores that directly compare negative and 
positive interpretations by calculating proportions or ratios (e.g., Moser, Huppert, Foa, & 
Simons, 2012). The advantage of absolute over relative bias scores is that they allow 
disentangling valence-specific biases, namely decreased positive versus increased negative 
interpretations. Yet, relative bias scores may better quantify the depression-linked distortion in 
emotional information-processing (Shane & Peterson, 2007). Indeed, toxic effects of a negative 
bias could be dependent on how this bias operates relative to the presence of positive 
interpretations. Comparing negative with positive interpretations may reveal larger effect sizes 
than absolute indexes. Examining the moderating role of the interpretation bias score is 
important to identify the specific interpretation biases in depression as hypothesized by 
theoretical models (Clark et al., 1999; Holmes et al., 2009; Ingram, 1984) as well as to gain 
insight in to how best to quantify the severity of distortions in the interpretation of ambiguous 
emotional information.
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The present meta-analysis
The purpose of this meta-analysis is to provide the first comprehensive and objective 
summary of a research on interpretation biases related to depression. The first objective is to 
assess the overall effect size of the relation between interpretation biases and depressive 
symptoms. The second objective is to examine theoretical and methodological factors that may 
moderate this relationship. As moderators, this meta-analysis examines the clinical status of 
depression, the role of self-referent stimuli, the use of mental imagery instructions, the 
measurement method, and the interpretation bias score. An exhaustive examination of 
interpretation biases in depression is necessary to be able to draw empirically-informed 
conclusions about the strength of the relation between depression and interpretation bias. This 
study may accordingly inform theory, research, and treatment.
Method
Literature search strategies
Complementary approaches were used to identify relevant articles. First, studies were 
collected through comprehensive searches of electronic databases PsycINFO, Embase, ISI Web 
of Science, Scopus, and PubMed through September 2016. To maximize coverage of the 
relevant studies, the following comprehensive search string was entered into the databases: 
(depress* OR dysphor*) AND (interpret* OR apprais* OR schema* OR process* OR cognitive 
OR affective) AND bias*. In addition, the databases were also searched using search strings 
combining the name of common interpretation bias paradigms (scrambled sentences test, 
homophone task, homograph task, ambiguous face identification task, recognition test, lexical 
decision task, interpretation bias questionnaires, word-sentence association task, ambiguous 
story and sentence completion tasks, grammar decision task, reading time task, semantic 
priming tasks) and (depress* OR dysphor*). Second, Google Scholar was searched using the 
search string (depress* OR dysphor*) AND ("interpretation bias" OR "interpretive bias") in 
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order to identify studies that may not have be included in the PsycINFO, Embase, ISI Web of 
Science, Scopus, or PubMed databases. Third, unpublished studies were searched in electronic 
thesis and dissertation databases, namely ISI Web of Science, Open Access Theses and 
Dissertations, Open thesis, DART-Europe E-theses Portal, EThOS e-theses online service, and 
ProQuest dissertations. Here, we searched for available records until September 2016 using the 
same search string as for published work. Finally, reference lists of review articles (Blanchette 
& Richards, 2010; Gotlib & Joormann, 2010; Hirsch et al., 2016; Mathews & Macleod, 2005; 
Wisco, 2009), a meta-analysis (Phillips et al., 2010), and eligible articles included in this meta-
analysis were hand-searched to ensure that as many relevant studies were considered for 
inclusion. Each article was assessed for relevance based on the inclusion and exclusion criteria.
Inclusion and exclusion criteria
The following criteria were applied to select the studies for this meta-analysis. First, 
articles were full-text reports written in the English language. Second, articles were considered 
only if the reported research employed interpretation bias tasks that included ambiguous 
emotional stimuli and measured the emotional tone (i.e., negative or positive) of the 
interpretations. Regarding the stimuli, interpretation tasks were allowed to present verbal and/or 
visual stimuli. This is because interpretation (bias) is a semantic process that operates on mental 
representations that are not restricted to the verbal domain (e.g., use of mental images to resolve 
ambiguity). Of note, less ambiguous stimuli may also elicit varying interpretations among 
individuals (cf. Holmes, Mathews, Dalgleish, & Mackintosh, 2006). However, this meta-
analysis is restricted to interpretation biases that have been studied in the context of ambiguity 
resolution to accord with the majority of research on interpretation biases in psychopathology 
(see Hirsch et al., 2016) and influential cognitive models of depression (e.g., Clark et al., 1999; 
Ingram et al., 1999). Studies presenting no ambiguous stimuli or studies that have probed 
emotional interpretations of neutral information are beyond the scope of this meta-analysis.
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Third, articles were included if the reported research included at least one sample of 
individuals with major depression, dysthymic disorder, remitted depression, or self-reported 
elevated levels of depressive symptoms. The clinical status of major depression and dysthymic 
disorder had to be assessed through clinical interview (e.g., Structured Clinical Interview for 
DSM-5; First, Williams, Karg, & Spitzer, 2015). The term ‘clinical depression’ will be used to 
refer to individuals meeting the diagnostic criteria for major depression and dysthymic disorder 
according to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013). The status of remitted depression had to be determined through clinical 
interview and/or validated questionnaires (e.g., Diagnostic Inventory for Depression; 
Zimmerman, Sheeran, & Young, 2004) to ensure that criteria for clinical depression were met 
in the past and not currently. Elevated levels of depressive symptoms in undiagnosed 
individuals had to be measured by validated questionnaires with established cutoff scores (e.g., 
a score ≥ 14 on the Beck Depression Inventory - II; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996). Studies 
assessing depression with single-item scales were not eligible because such measures do not 
provide a representative assessment of the heterogeneous symptoms of depression. Studies 
were excluded if the sample or participant recruitment featured one of the following 
characteristics: (a) the sample included individuals with bipolar disorder, (b) the sample 
involved patients with a principal diagnosis other than depression, (c) participant selection was 
based on other criteria than depressive symptoms, and (d) the sample involved healthy 
individuals in which depressive mood was experimentally induced.
Fourth, articles were considered if the reported research adopted a categorical study 
design comparing interpretation biases in non-depressed or never-depressed samples versus 
samples of undiagnosed individuals reporting elevated depressive symptoms, clinical or 
remitted depression. In addition, articles were considered if the reported research adopted a 
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dimensional study design to examine interpretation bias along the continuum of depressive 
symptom severity.
Fifth, we restricted the focus of this meta-analysis to studies including adult samples 
with ages ranging between 18 and 65 years. Studies that exclusively focused on children, 
adolescents, and older adults were excluded. Age criteria were applied because developmental 
factors may influence the process of interpretation and its emotional biases (e.g., age-related 
differences in executive functions and positivity biases).
Finally, articles were only considered if depression was examined in relation to naturally 
occurring interpretation biases. When investigations involved procedures aimed at inducing or 
reducing interpretation biases through cognitive training (Hirsch et al., 2016), only data from 
the baseline measurements were considered.
Selection of studies
The PRISMA flow diagram depicted in Figure 1 illustrates the literature search and 
winnowing process. A total of 17,136 records were identified through database searches and 
3,378 records were identified through other sources. After removing duplicates, the titles and 
abstracts of 7,934 papers were inspected according to the inclusion and exclusion criteria. This 
reduced the number of relevant articles to 162. The full-text articles were read and assessed for 
eligibility. This further reduced the number of relevant articles to 82. In cases where an article 
met the listed criteria but reported insufficient data, the authors were contacted to provide the 
data required for inclusion. Studies were excluded if data necessary for inclusion were not 
retrieved. This resulted in the exclusion of 5 articles. A total of 77 articles reporting 87 
independent studies (80 published, 7 unpublished) with 9,443 participants and 96 comparisons 
were included.
The first and second author conducted the selection process independently to ensure its 
reliability. Both raters judged the relevance of all records based on the outlined criteria. The 
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interrater agreement was very good (kappa=.97). Cases of disagreement were solved through 
discussion until full agreement was obtained.
Data coding system
Table 1 presents the characteristics of the published and unpublished studies included 
in this meta-analysis. A standardized coding system was applied to every study. For each 
research report, we coded the following study characteristics: author information, year of 
publication, journal, and whether the article was published or not. Regarding the sample 
characteristics, we coded total sample size, gender composition, and mean age of the sample. 
For studies employing categorical and dimensional study designs, we separately coded the 
characteristics related to depressive symptom severity or depression groups. For categorical 
studies, we coded clinical status of the depression groups (i.e., undiagnosed elevated depressive 
symptoms, clinical depression, and remitted depression), clinical assessment procedure (i.e., 
clinical interview), group comparisons, and group sizes. For dimensional studies, we coded 
symptom assessment procedure and mean symptom severity. Moreover, the following 
moderators were coded: clinical status of depression (i.e., undiagnosed elevated depressive 
symptoms, clinical depression, remitted depression; only for studies that have used a categorical 
study design), self-reference of stimulus materials (i.e., self-referent, not-self-referent), the use 
of mental imagery instructions (i.e., yes, no), measurement method (i.e., direct versus indirect), 
computed interpretation bias score (i.e., absolute positive, absolute negative, relative indexes), 
and study design (i.e., dimensional, categorical).
The first and second author extracted the study characteristics and checked for accuracy. 
With kappa’s ranging from .84 to .100, good to very good interrater reliability was found. 
Disagreements were resolved by discussion until consensus was reached.
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Methodological quality assessment
The quality of included studies was assessed using a rating scale based on Downs and 
Black’s Checklist for Measuring Quality (Downs & Black, 1998). This rating scale for non-
randomized designs was recently adapted for use in meta-analytic research on interpretation 
biases toward illness-related information (Hughes, Hirsch, Chalder, & Moss-Morris, 2016). The 
adapted Checklist for Measuring Quality contained the highest number of relevant items to this 
review (see Appendix S1). The ratings scale consisted of 18 items assessing the quality in terms 
of reporting, external validity, internal validity, confounders, and power of the study. Each 
criterion is rated on a two-point scale (0/no, 1/yes), with higher scores indicating superior 
quality. Two independent researchers conducted the ratings. Acceptable inter-rater agreement 
was found (kappa=.74). Disagreements were solved by discussion, and the final coding 
reflected consensus.
Meta-analytic procedures
Statistical analyses were based on Hedges’s g, which provides better estimates of effect 
sizes for small sample studies (Hedges & Olkin, 1985). Similar to the Cohen’s d coefficient, a 
Hedges’s g value between 0.2–0.5 indicates a small effect size (ES), a value between 0.5–0.8 
points to a medium ES, and values of 0.8 or larger indicate a large ES (Cohen, 1988). All ESs 
were coded such that a positive value of Hedges’s g points to a more negative or less positive 
interpretation bias. If interpretation bias was measured by more than one instrument, the 
average ES for the measures was first computed within a study (accounting for the correlation 
between the measures).
We calculated the pooled ES across studies using Comprehensive Meta-Analysis 
(version 3.3.070, Biostat, Englewood, NJ). The mean ESs were preferentially extracted from 
means, standard deviations and sample sizes, as well as correlations coefficients. If these data 
were not available, we calculated the ES by using the available statistics: reported Cohen’s d 
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values, between-group t values and sample sizes, between group p values and degrees of 
freedom, Fisher’s Z along with sample sizes.
ES estimates were extracted from both categorical and dimensional study designs. For 
studies employing a categorical design, we computed the ES indicating the difference in 
interpretation bias between the depressed (i.e., undiagnosed elevated depressive symptoms, 
clinical, remitted) and the non-depressed groups. The ESs were computed by subtracting the 
average score of the depressed group from the average score of the non-depressed group, and 
dividing the result by the pooled standard deviation of the two groups. For dimensional designs, 
all ES computations were performed based on Fisher’s z transformation of the correlation 
coefficients. We created a unitary/pooled set of effect sizes combining data from categorical 
and dimensional study designs in light of converging results from separate analyses. This 
approach was chosen in light of converging results from separate analyses of the data sets from 
categorical and dimensional studies. Note that we controlled for over-inflation of mean ESs 
caused by expressing the same results in a dimensional and categorical manner by randomly 
excluding one of the indexes. When a study reported more than one level of a moderator (e.g., 
both absolute indexes of bias), dependencies were accounted for by randomly selecting one 
within-study level per moderator (Hunter & Schmidt, 2004). This technique enabled 
independent analysis at the moderator level.
As we expected a considerable degree of heterogeneity among studies, we calculated 
mean effect sizes using a random-effects model in all analyses (Riley, Higgins, & Deeks, 2011). 
Homogeneity was assessed with the I2-statistic, which indicated the percentage of observed 
heterogeneity. A value of 0% indicates no heterogeneity, values ≤25% indicate low 
heterogeneity, values ≤50% indicate moderate heterogeneity, and values ≥75% indicate high 
heterogeneity (Borenstein, Hedges, Higgins, & Rothstein, 2009). We calculated 95% 
confidence intervals (CI) around I2 using the heterogi module for Stata (Orsini, Bottai, Higgins, 
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& Buchan, 2006). In order to estimate the pooled ES with and without outliers, we defined 
outliers as being studies in which the 95% CI was outside the 95% CI of the pooled ES for all 
studies (two-sided).
We conducted moderator analyses testing the following variables: clinical status of 
depression (for categorical studies only), self-reference of stimuli, use of mental imagery 
instructions, measurement method, computed interpretation bias score, year of publication, 
study design, and methodological quality. Mixed-effects models were used to test categorical 
moderators. Meta-regression analyses using a restricted maximum likelihood model with the 
Knapp-Hartung method tested the continuous moderators (Borenstein et al., 2009).
We examined publication bias in three ways. First, we visually inspected funnel plots, 
which display the standard error for each study against the study's ES. In the presence of a 
publication bias, there would be a higher concentration of studies at the lower side of the plot. 
Second, we used the Duval & Tweedie trim-and-fill procedure (Duval & Tweedie, 2000). This 
procedure provides corrected ESs and confidence intervals that account for these missing 
studies based on the asymmetry in the funnel plot (Borenstein et al., 2009; Duval & Tweedie, 
2000). Finally, we used Egger’s test of the intercept to test significance of the asymmetry of the 
funnel plot (Sterne, Becker, & Egger, 2006). When there is no evidence of funnel plot 
asymmetry, the intercept is not significantly different from zero (Sterne et al., 2006).
Results
Characteristics of the studies
Sample sizes ranged from 7 to 1,173 totaling 9,443 participants. The mean age ranged 
from 18 to 44.81 years and the proportion of female participants ranged from 55.1% to 100%. 
The number of studies with a dimensional design (k=41) was comparable to the number of 
studies with a categorical design (k=46). With regard to task properties, most studies relied on 
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direct measurement methods (k=67), computed absolute bias scores (k=51), presented self-
referent stimuli (k=62), and did not provide mental imagery instructions (k=61).
Methodological quality
The average overall quality rating was 75.68% (SD=9.43) with ratings ranging from 
47.37% to 94.74%. Table 2 presents the average scores on the items of the checklist. The table 
reveals lower scores for the item assessing whether the studies tested participants’ engagement 
with the task(s) and items related to the quality of reporting (confounders, exact probability 
values, withdrawals/drop-outs, and power analysis).
Overall effect size
Table 3 presents detailed statistics of the analyses examining the overall ES. The mean 
pooled ES of the 87 studies examining interpretation bias in relation to depression rendered a 
medium Hedges’ g score (g=0.72, p<.001). Extracting the 13 outlying studies that did not 
overlap with the 95% CI of the pooled ES, did not substantially alter the overall Hedges’ g score 
(g=0.74, p<.001). Heterogeneity was high (I2=75%) for the overall pooled ES and medium 
(I2=50%) after removing outlying studies. These results remained unaltered when conducting a 
‘remove one’ analysis in Comprehensive Meta-Analysis (Borenstein et al., 2011) to gauge the 
impact of each study. Figure 2 depicts the ES for each study and the 95% CI around the ES.
Moderator analyses
Table 3 presents the results of the moderator analyses for both theoretical and 
methodological variables. For the theoretical moderators, mixed-effects models revealed that 
the self-referent nature of the stimuli significantly moderated the relation between interpretation 
bias and depression. Studies presenting self-referent stimuli yielded significantly larger ESs 
than studies using tasks that do not present self-referent stimuli. Yet, the small ES for studies 
not presenting self-referent stimulus materials was still significant. Neither the clinical status 
of depression nor the use of mental imagery instructions was a significant moderator. As shown 
INTERPRETATION BIASES IN DEPRESSION 21
in Table 3, ESs were not significantly different among studies in clinical depression, remitted 
depression, or undiagnosed elevated depressive symptoms. The ESs for each of the depressed 
groups were significant and in the medium range. Moreover, regarding use of mental imagery 
instructions, equivalent medium significant ESs were observed for studies that did or did not 
provide mental imagery instructions to resolve the ambiguous emotional information.
For methodological moderators, the mixed-effect models demonstrated that both the 
measurement method and the computed interpretation bias score had a significant effect on the 
relation between interpretation bias and depression. Regarding measurement method, the ES 
was only significant for studies using direct measurement methods. Studies employing indirect 
methods produced a non-significant ES. Moreover, the computed bias index was a significant 
moderator. As shown in Table 3, larger ESs were observed for studies computing relative bias 
scores compared to studies computing absolute positive or negative bias scores. The ESs for 
studies using relative bias scores as well as studies using absolute bias scores were significantly 
different from zero. Finally, the study design was a significant moderator. Larger ESs were 
found for dimensional study designs compared to categorical study design (see Table 3).3
Risk of bias
There were some indications for a small positive effect of publication bias. The Duval 
& Tweedie trim and fill procedure inputted 11 studies with ESs below the mean. This is also 
visible from the funnel plot in Figure 3 (black dots indicate inputted missing studies). After 
adjustment for publication bias according to Duval and Tweedie's trim and ﬁll procedure, the 
overall ES was reduced from 0.72 (see Table 3) to 0.63 (95%-CI: [0.53; 0.74]). This adjusted 
overall ES remained significant and within the medium range. Egger’s test for the asymmetry 
in the funnel plot was not significant (intercept=-0.59, 95%-CI: [-1.61; 0.42], p=0.25).
3 Sensitivity analyses yielded converging results with respect to significant moderators from separate analyses of 
the data sets from categorical and dimensional studies, and are therefore not reported here.
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Moreover, we further assessed the risk of bias by performing meta-regression analyses 
testing the effect of methodological quality of the included studies and publication year on the 
relation between interpretation bias and depression. Neither methodological quality (slope 
b=0.01, 95%-CI:[-0.01; 0.02], p=0.42), nor publication year (slope b=0.03, 95%-CI:[-0.01; 
0.01], p=0.55) moderated the ES, even when the effect of the other variable was held constant.
Discussion
Intense research during the past four decades has generated a wealth of data on the 
relation between interpretation biases and depression. Yet, empirical findings have been mixed 
and investigators have drawn diverging conclusions regarding the strength of the available 
evidence. This study aimed to provide the first comprehensive meta-analysis to assess the 
current state of research in this field of interest. In line with theoretical predictions (Clark et al., 
1999; Holmes et al., 2009; Ingram, 1984), prior reviews (Mathews & Macleod, 2005; Wisco, 
2009), and a meta-analysis (Phillips et al., 2010), the results revealed a medium ES supporting 
the hypothesized interpretation biases linked to depression. However, there was medium to high 
heterogeneity of the pooled ES. This was expected given the nature of interpretation bias as a 
complex higher-order cognitive process and the methodological diversity that characterizes 
interpretation bias tasks. Several a priori identified moderators related to theory and 
methodology were examined to determine the sources of this heterogeneity.
Moderators of interpretation biases in depression
Clinical status of depression
In contrast to the prediction that the magnitude of interpretation biases differs across 
depression groups (Beck & Haigh, 2014; Clark et al., 1999; Ingram, 1984), this meta-analysis 
found that the clinical status of depression did not moderate the relation between depression 
and interpretation bias. The ESs for interpretation bias in samples of undiagnosed individuals 
with elevated depressive symptoms, patients with clinical depression, and patients remitted 
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from depression were equivalent for each of the depressed groups. However, the lack of 
evidence for differences in ESs between depression groups suggests that a strict clinical cutoff 
may be of little significance.4
The fact that a significant ES was observed for remitted depression supports the notion 
that interpretation biases are not mere correlates of a depressive mood state. In line with 
predictions by cognitive models (Clark et al., 1999; Ingram, 1984), interpretation biases may 
remain present after the depressive episode. Of note, remission designs are not conclusive with 
respect to whether interpretation bias represents a scar or a vulnerability factor (Just et al., 
2001). Even if interpretation bias would be a vulnerability factor that occurs in remitted 
depression, then it still is unclear whether the bias represents a factor that operates constantly 
vs. a latent factor that is triggered by stress or negative mood states (Ingram & Siegle, 2009). 
Current studies are limited in their ability to address this question. Though a majority of studies 
in remitted depressed individuals did not utilize mood induction procedures (for one exception, 
see Van der Does, 2005), it cannot be concluded that a negative mood is not necessary to elicit 
interpretation biases because residual depressive symptoms may have triggered the 
interpretation biases. Future work needs to reveal whether interpretation biases reflect a scar or 
vulnerability factor using priming designs that simulate the activation of the interpretation bias 
in response to stress as well as longitudinal behavioral high-risk studies to examine if 
interpretation biases occur before a depressive episode and prospectively predict its onset.
Centrality of self-relevance
The moderating role of self-reference indicates that the nature of stimuli that prompt 
interpretation is important in eliciting a depression-linked bias. Interpretation biases were 
particularly strong for self-referent stimuli. This is consistent with the prediction that stimuli 
4 Inspection of depressive symptoms levels in undiagnosed individuals revealed that these samples had, on average 
across studies, only moderate severity. The lack of significant differences in ESs from studies in clinical vs. 
undiagnosed samples is thus less likely accounted by similar depression severity.
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relevant to people’s negative schemas (Clark et al., 1999) or memory networks (Ingram, 1984) 
produce the emotional bias in interpretation. This finding provides quantitative evidence for 
similar conclusions reached in a prior narrative review (Wisco, 2009).
Interestingly, the findings revealed that depressed individuals also interpret ambiguous 
information that is not self-referent in a more negative and/or less positive manner. This 
observation is indicative for a general bias to endorse negative interpretations (Mathews & 
Macleod, 2005). However, it cannot be excluded that stimuli that are not directly self-referent 
become imbued with personal meaning through self-reflection by depressed individuals (Mor 
& Winquist, 2002). Nonetheless, the finding that both self-referent and not self-referent stimuli 
may elicit depression-linked interpretation biases points to the importance of careful stimulus 
selection. Important sources of noise may be due to stimuli that do not adequately reflect the 
concerns relevant to depression, or not self-referent stimuli that allow respondents to ascribe 
largely varying meanings. These sources of noise may result in an underestimation of the ES or 
produce null-findings. This issue may be particularly important for cognitive-experimental 
paradigms of interpretation bias which often do not systematically present self-referent or 
ideographically self-relevant stimulus materials.
Use of mental imagery
Mental imagery instructions did not modify the ESs of relation between interpretation 
biases and depression. Equivalent (significant) ESs were observed for studies that provided 
mental imagery instructions and studies that did not do so. This is surprising given that the 
studies included in this meta-analyses instructed participants to create mental images involving 
themselves as a central actor, which is expected to enhance self-relevance and thereby 
interpretation bias. This observation does not confirm theories advocating that mentally 
simulating negative outcomes amplifies depressed mood (Holmes et al., 2009). However, this 
finding cannot rule out that mental imagery is not an important factor in the process of 
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interpretation. This is because many studies on interpretation bias do not use explicit 
instructions to abstain from mental imagery. Consequently, these studies cannot exclude the 
possibility that participants spontaneously used mental imagery when resolving the ambiguity 
of the presented stimuli. To understand the role of mental imagery in interpretation bias, it is 
important that studies quantify the extent to which mental imagery is involved in the 
interpretation bias task as well as the imagery perspective (i.e., first-person vs. third-person).
Measurement method
The measurement method moderated the relation between depression and interpretation 
biases. Larger ESs were observed for studies using direct methods, which require respondents 
to report the emotional tone of their interpretation(s). The non-significant ES for indirect 
measurement methods indicates that these methods have not provided reliable evidence for 
interpretation biases in depression and interpretation biases. These results suggest that method-
related factors shape the conclusions and accord with skeptical opinions about the strength of 
the evidence for interpretation biases in depression (Blanchette & Richards, 2010; Foland-Ross 
& Gotlib, 2012; Gotlib & Joormann, 2010).
Based on these results, it could be argued that conclusions stating that depression is 
marked by interpretation biases are premature (Blanchette & Richards, 2010; Foland-Ross & 
Gotlib, 2012; Gotlib & Joormann, 2010). This is because direct methods are susceptible to 
response biases and demand characteristics, and studies that tried to overcome these limitations 
by using indirect methods failed to provide evidence. Hence, it is possible that depressed 
individuals are inclined to report more negative and less positive interpretations due to factors 
related to anhedonia (e.g., loss of pleasure, loss of interest), which causes them to engage less 
in considering all attributes of a situation and to report default negative responses. This process 
may occur regardless of the encountered situation and interpretation processes serving to 
explain the situation.
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Alternatively, it could be argued that the applied indirect measures do not adequately 
capture the essence of interpretation biases in depression. While self-reports directly measure 
the content of emotional interpretations, indirect measures such as reaction times, ERP 
components, or startle reflexes provide an index that reflects the association between multiple 
stimuli presented (e.g., an ambiguous cue and a disambiguating target). Based on these 
associations, it is inferred what type of interpretations participants have generated. This remains 
an approximation of the content of the inferred interpretation. Moreover, there are also specific 
difficulties associated with certain indirect measures. For example, indexes based on reaction 
times are subject to variability in motor responses associated with elevated depression levels 
and these could mask subtle reaction time differences. Unfortunately, investigators do not 
routinely apply methods to (partly) address this problem (Faust, Balota, Spieler, & Ferraro, 
1999). It is important to note, however, that this meta-analysis found an interpretation bias in 
remitted depressed individuals, which suggests that interpretation biases are also present in the 
absence of strongly elevated depression levels. This argues against the response bias 
explanation for the findings, though it cannot be excluded that residual symptoms exert an 
influence on interpretation bias and set the stage for response biases.
In sum, depression is associated with interpretation biases, but it cannot be ruled out that 
other factors than interpretation biases (partly) account of the present evidence base. This 
warrants a more nuanced view on strength of the evidence for such biases in depression.
Interpretation bias scores
Consistent with the prediction that depression features a tendency to impose more 
negative and fewer positive interpretations (Beck & Haigh, 2014; Clark et al., 1999; Holmes et 
al., 2009; Ingram, 1984), the analyses revealed that higher depression levels were linked to 
decreased positive and increased negative interpretations. Both biases had equivalent ESs. 
Hence, it is not surprising that relative bias scores comparing negative versus positive 
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interpretations produced a larger ES than the absolute bias indexes. Relative bias scores may 
represent more powerful indices to quantify the severity of the distortions in emotional 
information-processing (Shane & Peterson, 2007), including emotional interpretations of 
ambiguous information. However, both relative and absolute indexes have their merit. Whereas 
relative biases powerfully capture the emotional distortions, absolute indexes disentangle the 
lack of a positive bias or the presence of a negative bias.
Methodological quality and risk of bias
The average methodological quality of the studies was high. Yet, there is room for 
improvement given that various research reports failed to clarify how they handled missing data 
and determined sample size (e.g., power calculations). If not reported, this missing information 
may represent a threat to the transparency and replicability of research findings in this area. 
Importantly, neither methodological quality nor publication year moderated the overall ES. This 
suggests that the risk of bias caused by the variability in methodological quality or the time 
when a study was published is minimal.
Though unpublished reports and null-findings were included in this meta-analysis to 
reduce the risk of publication bias, there is an indication that studies with non-significant results 
are less likely to be published. However, the adjusted ES remained significant and in the 
medium range. This suggests that publication bias was not a large concern in this meta-analysis.
Clinical implications
The present findings have implications for cognitive training methods aimed at 
ameliorating interpretation biases in depression. These methods train individuals in resolving 
ambiguous emotional information in a benign manner through repeated practice (Hirsch et al., 
2016). While some evidence indicates that these procedures reduce interpretation biases 
(Menne-Lothmann et al., 2014), the effect on mental health problems may be limited (Cristea 
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et al., 2015). This suggests that there is ample room for improvement. The results of this meta-
analysis may provide some clues to advance this field.
In light of the finding that interpretation biases are particularly expressed for self-
referent information, training procedures may need to encourage self-referential processing 
during training by referring to participants’ own character and daily life. Engaging participants 
in self-referent processing may increase the beneficial impact of newly formed positive 
interpretations. This is because self-reference may increase the saliency of the incongruence 
with a negative interpretation bias. Though ambiguous stimuli are self-referent in most training 
procedures (Möbius, Tendolkar, Lohner, Baltussen, & Becker, 2015; Williams, Blackwell, 
Mackenzie, Holmes, & Andrews, 2013), these procedures vary in the extent to which the 
disambiguating positive outcomes make explicit reference to the respondent. Processing the 
positive outcomes in a self-referent manner could be particularly important to boost the 
effectiveness of the training.
Moreover, the finding that the measurement method altered the strength of the relation 
between depression and interpretation bias has important consequences for these training 
procedures. If evidence for interpretation biases in depression continues to be tied to direct 
measurement methods and thus remains subject to alternative explanations, then this could 
become a threat for the internal validity of procedures that aim to modify interpretation bias. 
That is, if there is no unambiguous evidence for interpretation bias, then it renders unclear 
which processes are in fact targeted and altered by these training procedures. Indeed, most 
training studies assess the effectiveness of the training procedure using direct measurement 
methods (for an excpetion, see Möbius et al., 2015), and thus the interpretation of the results in 
terms of the active working mechanism is subject to the same limitations that apply to the 
interpretation bias tasks. Therefore, studies that aim to modify interpretation biases may need 
to integrate both direct and indirect measurement methods in a task independent from the 
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training. This is to assess their correspondence and gain insight into the possible mechanisms 
involved in interpretation bias training.
Methodological recommendations
Several methodological considerations deserve future attention. First, research needs to 
study the correspondence between direct and indirect measures of interpretation bias within 
single paradigms (Cowden Hindash & Amir, 2012; Käse et al., 2013; Moser et al., 2012). This 
is important to understand whether these measures reflect the same underlying process. While 
some correspondence between these measures is expected, direct and indirect indexes may only 
have weak to moderate correlations when they are used to tap different aspects of interpretation. 
For example, indirect measures may be better suited to tap the unintentional (i.e., interpretations 
are formed irrespective of current goals), unconscious (i.e., the interpretation process occurs 
outside awareness), efficient (i.e., the interpretation process recruits minimal cognitive 
resources), and/or uncontrollable (i.e., limited ability to stop the interpretation process) 
interpretations (Teachman, Joormann, Steinman, & Gotlib, 2012). Direct measures are simply 
be less suitable for such purposes. In addition, it deserves future study to identify if some 
indirect measures are more suitable to tap specific biases in the process of interpretation (e.g., 
unintentional, uncontrollable interpretations).
Second, future research may need to characterize the nature of the interpretation biases 
involved in many of the commonly-used interpretation tasks. This seems important in light of 
the large diversity in questionnaires and experimental paradigms used to assess the bias (Hirsch 
et al., 2016). It is likely that different tasks tap into different aspects of interpretation bias. 
Interpretation involves the subprocesses of generation and selection of meanings that are 
plausible in a particular situation (Wisco, 2009). Both the generation and selection of 
interpretations may occur in an intentional versus unintentional, conscious versus unconscious, 
inefficient versus efficient, and/or controllable versus uncontrollable manner. Yet, there is 
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currently little consensus which tasks best measure these different aspects of the interpretation 
process and its bias. Relatedly, little is known about the validity and reliability of interpretation 
bias paradigms. To address this issue, a detailed conceptual analysis of interpretation bias tasks 
is required as well as studies that examine their psychometric properties. These endeavors will 
allow future meta-analyses to identify sources of heterogeneity.
A last recommendation relates to the comparison conditions used to infer interpretation 
bias in depressed groups. That is, the magnitude of the interpretation bias is often based on a 
comparison of depressed individuals with non-depressed controls, but the composition of the 
control groups varies across studies. Non-depressed individuals are usually sampled from the 
community, student populations, or both based on varying operational definitions. “Non-
depressed” may refer to low self-reported scores on a questionnaire, not meeting diagnostic 
criteria for major depression, or not meeting clinical criteria with no history of depression. The 
variability in the type of non-depressed participants may explain some of the variability in the 
strength of the ESs. However, most research does not report (or assess) details regarding the 
non-depressed sample. Future research needs to provide detailed descriptions of the control 
group(s) included in the study.
Limitations
Several limitations should be acknowledged. First, we cannot rule out that the sample 
of included studies is not representative for all studies that have been conducted to investigate 
the relation between depression and interpretation bias. We attempted to minimize the 
possibility of missing relevant articles by performing comprehensive systematic searches in 
various online databases and by soliciting unpublished research. Importantly, the publication 
bias analyses indicated this was not a major concern.
Second, there was considerable heterogeneity of the pooled ESs and a priori identified 
moderators were not able to fully explain this heterogeneity. This suggests other factors not 
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examined in this meta-analysis had an influence. The fact that there were unaccounted levels of 
heterogeneity is an important observation, in particular because this meta-analysis tested key 
theoretical and methodological variables which were identified a priori. Therefore, this 
limitation not only applies to this meta-analysis, but represents a limitation that characterizes 
the current literature in this field of interest. As outlined in previous sections, this meta-analysis 
identified several methodological and theoretical challenges to understand the nature of 
interpretation biases. Addressing these challenges may enable future meta-analyses to explain 
larger proportions of study heterogeneity. Despite this limitation, it should be noted that 
sensitivity analyses on the separate sets of categorical and dimensional studies yielded similar 
results. This adds to the reliability of the findings even in the face of the heterogeneity.
Finally, this meta-analysis included data from cross-sectional studies examining 
associations between depression and interpretation bias. This precludes inferences regarding 
causality. The presented evidence for a link between interpretation bias and depression does not 
imply that interpretation bias causes depression as is proposed by some theoretical models. This 
requires experimental studies that manipulate interpretation biases and examine its influence on 
depressive symptoms of depression (Cristea et al., 2015; Menne-Lothmann et al., 2014). Yet, 
these methodologies also face a number of challenges and the present meta-analyses may 
inform the next steps to advance this field.
General conclusion
The following conclusions are supported by this meta-analysis. First, there is evidence 
that depression is associated with interpretation biases, but caution is necessary because the 
evidence draws on studies using direct methods. Second, there is no evidence that the magnitude 
of interpretation differs across individuals with undiagnosed elevated depressive symptoms, 
clinical, or remitted depression. Third, interpretation biases are stronger for self-referent 
stimuli, but also occur for stimuli that are not self-referent. Fourth, mental imagery instructions 
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during the interpretation task do not influence the relation between depression and interpretation 
biases. Finally, interpretation biases are marked by fewer positive and more negative meanings, 
which can be combined into a relative bias to comprehensively capture depression-linked biases 
in interpretation. These findings have important theoretical, methodological, and clinical 
implications that warrant further research.
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Appendix S1: Methodological Quality Checklist
1. Is the hypothesis, aim, objective of the study clearly described? The hypotheses, aims, and 
objectives must be explicitly formulated. Scoring: 1=YES, 0=NO.
2. Are all primary outcomes to be measured clearly described in the Introduction or Methods 
section? If the main outcomes are first mentioned in the results section, the answer should 
be no. If all primary outcomes are described in the Introduction, the answer is yes. Scoring: 
1=YES, 0=NO.
3. Are the characteristics of the participants included in the study clearly described? For 
studies involving clinical samples, the inclusion and exclusion criteria (in terms of age, sex, 
diagnosis) should be given as well as the deﬁnition and the source for the control 
participants should be provided. For studies involving nonclinical samples, an operational 
deﬁnition of dysphoric depressive state should be provided. For all studies, demographic 
information should be provided (age, sex) as well as depressive symptom severity levels 
for each group (categorical study designs) or the total sample (dimensional study designs). 
Scoring: 1=YES, 0=NO.
4. Were the subjects asked to participate in the study representative of the entire population 
from which they were recruited? The study must identify the source population for patients 
and describe how the patients were selected. Scoring: 1=YES, 0=NO, 0=Unable to 
determine.
5. Were those subjects who were prepared to participate representative of the entire 
population from which they were recruited? The proportion of those asked who agreed 
should be stated. Scoring: 1=YES, 0=NO, 0=Unable to determine.
6. Were the participants recruited from the same population? Participants should be selected 
from the same population. For example, all patients should be recruited from the sample 
INTERPRETATION BIASES IN DEPRESSION 49
hospital, undergraduate students should be from the same university. Scoring: 1=YES, 
0=NO, 0=Unable to determine.
7. Were study participants recruited over the same time? Participants should have been 
recruited within a specified time window. Scoring: 1=YES, 0=NO, 0=Unable to determine. 
For a study which does not specify the time period over which patients were recruited, the 
question should be answered as unable to determine. Studies must be <3 years for yes, if 
>3 years then no.
8. Are the tasks and measures clearly described? The tasks and measures should be explicitly 
described with examples of the stimulus materials used. Scoring: 1=YES, 0=NO.
9. Were the main outcome measures used valid and reliable? The validity and reliability of 
the task and measures should be proved by referring to relevant prior work or by providing 
data supporting the use of the task to measure the key constructs (interpretation bias, 
depression). All primary outcomes need to be valid and reliable for yes. Scoring: 1=YES, 
0=NO, 0=Unable to determine.
10. Was the participants’ engagement with the experimental task(s) assessed? Did the study 
report checks for outliers, RTs from errors discarded, and/or exclusion of individuals not 
conforming to the task instructions? Scoring: 1=YES, 0=NO, 0=Unable to determine.
11. Did the study consider principal confounders (e.g., such as race, sex, marital status/family, 
age, SES (income or class), education) and was there adequate adjustment for confounding 
in the analyses from which the main findings were drawn? Studies need to examine 
potential group differences on potentially confounding variables (when utilizing a 
categorical design) or assess correlations with depression severity and potentially 
confounding variables (when utilizing a dimensional design). If the effect of the main 
confounders was not investigated or no adjustment was made in the final analyses the 
question should be answered as no. If no significant difference between groups or no 
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relation between confounder and key variable, then YES. Scoring: 2=YES, 
1=PARTIALLY, 0=NO, 0=Unable to determine.
12. Were the statistical tests used to assess the main outcomes appropriate? The statistical 
techniques used must be appropriate to the data. If no tests done but it would have been 
appropriate to do then the item should be scored as no. Scoring: 1=YES, 0=NO, 0=Unable 
to determine.
13. Are the main findings of the study clearly described? Simple outcome data (including 
denominators and numerators) should be reported for all major findings so that the reader 
can check the major analyses and conclusions. Scoring: 1=YES, 0=NO.
14. Does the study provide estimates of the random variability in the data for the main 
outcomes? In non-normally distributed data the inter-quartile range of results should be 
reported. In normally distributed data the standard error, standard deviation or confidence 
intervals should be reported. Scoring: 1=YES, 0=NO.
15. Have actual probability values been reported (e.g. 0.035 rather than <0.05) for the main 
outcomes except where the probability value is less than 0.001? Scoring: 1=YES, 0=NO.
16. Were withdrawals and drop-outs reported in terms of numbers and/or reasons? Scoring: 
1=YES, 0=NO.
17. If any of the results of the study were based on “data dredging”, was this made clear? Any 
analyses that had not been planned at the outset of the study should be clearly indicated. 
Retrospective analyses should be rated as ‘no’, prospective as ‘yes’. Scoring: 1=YES, 
0=NO, 0=Unable to determine.
18. Did the study have sufficient power to detect a clinically important effect where the 
probability value for a difference being due to chance <5%? The study needs to report a 
power analysis (calculating the required sample size given an effect size and desired 
power). Scoring: 1=YES, 0=NO.
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1. Beard et al., 2016 32.28 56.90 Dimensional CD, UDS 65 WSAP
Direct, 
Indirect
No Yes Absolute, Relative
2. Beevers et al., 2009 21.62 59 Categorical UDS, ND 107
Ambiguous face 
identification task
Direct No No Relative
3. Belli, 2013, u.p.1 20.25 57.5 Dimensional UDS, ND 38 ASSIQ Direct No Yes Absolute negative
4. Berna et al., 2011.1 22.49 65.38
Categorical, 
Dimensional
UDS, ND 144 AST Direct Yes Yes Relative
5. Berna et al., 2011.2 22.22 69.44
Categorical, 
Dimensional
UDS, ND 33 AST Direct Yes Yes
Absolute negative, 
Absolute positive, Relative
6. Bisson & Sears, 2007.1a 21.3 100.00 Categorical UDS, ND 61 Semantic priming task Indirect No No
Absolute positive, 
Absolute negative
7. Bisson & Sears, 2007.1b 21.3 100.00 Categorical UDS, ND 65 Semantic priming task Indirect No No
Absolute positive, 
Absolute negative
8. Bisson & Sears, 2007.2 20.7 100.00 Categorical UDS, ND 86 Semantic priming task Indirect No No
Absolute positive, 
Absolute negative
9. Blackwell & Holmes, 2010 37.7 71.42 Dimensional CD 7 SST Direct No Yes Relative
10. Blackwell et al. 2015 35.46 68.66 Dimensional CD 150 SST Direct No Yes Relative
11. Blaney et al., 1980.1 - 42.90 Dimensional UDS, ND 255 CBQ Direct Yes No Absolute negative
12. Blaney et al., 1980.2 - 49.47 Dimensional UDS, ND 351 CBQ Direct Yes No Absolute negative
13. Bos, 2005, u.p. .2 44.00 66.23 Categorical RD, ND 77
Ambiguous face 
identification task
Indirect No No Relative
14. Bowler et al., 2012 22.7 68.25 Dimensional UDS, ND 63 SST Direct No Yes
Relative, Absolute 
negative
15. Butler & Mathews, 1983 31.8 66.66 Categorical CD, ND 24 Interpretation ranking task Direct No Yes Absolute negative
16. Carver et al., 1985 - - Dimensional UDS, ND 175 CBQ Direct Yes No Absolute negative
17. Cooper & Wade, 2015 19.24 100 Dimensional UDS, ND 180 AST Direct Yes Yes Relative
18. Cowden Hindash & Amir, 
2012
18.68 46.00
Categorical, 
Dimensional
UDS, ND 50 WSAP
Direct, 
Indirect
No Yes
Absolute positive, 
Absolute negative
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19. Cowden Hindash & Rottenberg, 2015 21.36 64.4 Categorical UDS, ND 115 WSAP
Direct, 
Indirect
No Yes
Absolute positive, 
Absolute negative
20. D’Avanzato, 2013, u.p. 38.7 56.7 Categorical CD, ND 67 Homonym task Direct No No Absolute negative
21. Dohr et al., 1989 43.46 56.30 Categorical CD, RD, ND 44 IEM Direct No Yes Relative
22. Dickson, 2015, u.p. 20.26 68.4 Categorical RD, ND 38 SST Direct No Yes Relative
23. Dugas et al., 2005.2 22.5 77.02 Dimensional UDS, ND 148 AUSD Direct No Yes Relative
24. Everaert et al. 2013 19.79 87.50
Categorical, 
Dimensional
UDS, ND 64 SST Direct No Yes Relative
25. Everaert et al. 2014 20.31 87.32
Categorical, 
Dimensional
UDS, ND 44 SST Direct No Yes
Relative 
26. Everaert et al., 2015.2a 19.31 63.15 Dimensional UDS, ND 38 SST Direct No Yes Relative 
27. Everaert et al., 2015.2b 18.81 91.89 Dimensional UDS, ND 39 SST Direct No Yes Relative 
28. Everaert et al., 2016 21.84 90.17 Dimensional UDS, ND 119 SST Direct No Yes Relative 
29. Frost &Maclnnis, 1983 - 100.00 Dimensional UDS, ND 40 CBQ Direct Yes No Absolute negative
30. Goggin et al. 2011 39.95 60.00 Categorical CD, ND 46
Affective startle 
modulation
Indirect Yes No Absolute negative
31. Gupta & Kar, 2008 - - Categorical CD, RD, ND 30 CBQ Direct Yes No Absolute
32. Hähnel, 2008, u.p.2 22.45 100 Categorical CD, ND 84
IQSD, Semantic priming 
task
Direct, 
Indirect
No, Yes No, Yes Absolute negative
33. Halberstadt et al., 2008 - 60.33 Categorical UDS, CD, ND 1173 RIT Direct Yes Yes
Absolute positive, 
Absolute negative
34. Hedlund& Rude, 1995 32.40 75.47 Categorical CD, RD, ND 53 SST Direct No Yes Absolute negative
35. Hertel & El-Messidi, 2006.1 - 52.77 Categorical UDS, ND 36 Homonym task Direct No No, Yes Absolute negative
36. Holmes et al., 2008 22.60 61.11
Categorical,
Dimensional
UDS, ND 78 Homonym task Direct Yes No
Absolute positive, 
Absolute negative
Table 1. (continued).
A
ut
ho
r
M
ea
n 
ag
e,
 y
r
%
 fe
m
al
e 
(fu
ll 
sa
m
pl
e)
St
ud
y 
de
sig
n
C
lin
ic
al
 
st
at
us
Sa
m
pl
e 
si
ze
(s
)
In
te
rp
re
ta
tio
n 
ta
sk
B
ia
s 
as
se
ss
m
en
t 
U
se
 o
f 
im
ag
er
y 
in
st
ru
ct
io
ns
U
se
 o
f s
el
f-
re
fe
re
nt
 
st
im
ul
i
B
ia
s i
nd
ex
es
37. Huppert et al., 2003 20.00 69.60 Dimensional UDS, ND 102 MIB Direct No Yes Absolute
38. Juang & Knight, 2015 19.89 76 Categorical UDS, ND 72 AST Direct Yes Yes Relative
39. Käse et al., 2013 34.19 57.14 Categorical CD, ND 25
Affective startle 
modulation
Indirect Yes No Absolute negative
40. Kleim et al., 2014 24.44 58.33 Dimensional UDS, ND 47 AST Direct Yes Yes Relative
41. Krantz & Hammen, 1979.1 18 57.49 Categorical CD, ND 212 CBQ Direct Yes No Absolute negative
42. Krantz & Hammen, 1979.2 18 57.49 Categorical CD, ND 314 CBQ Direct Yes No Absolute negative
43. Lambert et al., 2013 33.00 100.00 Dimensional UDS, ND 55 BSIQ Direct No Yes Absolute negative
44. Lang et al., 2012 28.45 76.92 Dimensional CD 26 SST Direct No Yes Relative
45. Lawson & MacLeod, 1999 - 62.50 Categorical UDS, ND 32 Semantic priming task Indirect No No Absolute negative
46. Lee et al., 2016 32.96 73.20 Dimensional CD, UDS 71
SST, facial emotional 
identiﬁcation task
Direct, 
Indirect
No Yes, No Absolute, Relative
47. Lievaart et al., 2013 41.69 63.88 Dimensional CD 33 Sentence completion task Direct No Yes Relative
48. Lo, 2009, u.p. 24.98 45 Categorical RD, ND 40 SST Direct No Yes Relative
49. Miller & Norman, 1986.1 33.86 47.77 Categorical CD, ND 60 CBQ Direct Yes No Absolute negative
50. Miller & Norman, 1986.2 38.3 50.00 Categorical CD, ND 32 CBQ Direct Yes No Absolute negative
51. Mobius et al., 2015.1 23.04 54.32 Dimensional UDS, ND 81 WSAP
Direct, 
Indirect
No Yes
Absolute positive, 
Relative
52. Mobius et al., 2015.2 20.10 61.90 Dimensional UDS, ND 105 WSAP
Direct, 
Indirect
No Yes
Absolute positive, 
Relative
53. Mogg et al., 2006 43.65 70.83 Categorical CD, ND 48
Homonym task, Semantic 
priming task
Direct, 
Indirect
No No Absolute negative
54. Mor et al, 2014.1 25 55.10 Dimensional UDS, ND 46 Semantic priming task Indirect No No Relative
55. Mor et al, 2014.2 25 55.10 Dimensional UDS, ND 28 Semantic priming task Indirect No No
Absolute negative, 
Absolute positive 
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56. Moser et al., 2012 24.97 71.42 Categorical CD, ND 29 Semantic priming task Indirect No Yes
Absolute positive, 
Absolute negative
57. Norman et al., 1983 37.8 53.33 Dimensional CD, ND 60 CBQ Direct Yes No Absolute negative
58. Novović et al., 2014 19.59 62 Dimensional UDS, ND 1071 SST Direct No Yes Relative
59. Nunn et al., 1997 43.55 58.33 Categorical CD, ND 48 IBQ Direct Yes Yes
Absolute positive, 
Absolute negative
60. Phillips et al., 2012 29.91 81.37 Dimensional UDS, ND 306 SST Direct No Yes Relative
61. Pury, 2002 - 63.33 Dimensional UDS, ND 29 Homonym task Direct No No Relative
62. Rohrbacher & Reinecke, 2014 24 77.27 Dimensional UDS, ND 176 AST Direct Yes Yes Relative
63. Rohrbacher et al., 2014 21.93 76.00 Dimensional UDS, ND 54 AST Direct Yes Yes Relative 
64. Romero et al., 2014 21.87 80 Categorical RD, ND 70 SST Direct No Yes Relative 
65. Rude et al., 2001 34.16 75.60 Categorical RD, ND 41 SST Direct No Yes
Absolute negative, 
Absolute positive
66. Rude et al. 2002 18.34 74.63 Dimensional UDS, ND 339 SST Direct No Yes Relative 
67. Rude et al. 2003 18.1 80.95
Categorical
Dimensional
CD, ND 84 SST Direct No Yes
Relative 
68. Rude et al., 2010 35.23 100.00 Dimensional RD, ND 43 SST Direct No Yes Relative 
69. Sanchez et al., 2015 - 75.00 Dimensional UDS, ND 52 SST Direct No Yes Relative 
70. Sanchez et al., 2016 22.20 83.33 Dimensional UDS, ND 38 SST Direct No Yes Relative
71. Sears et al., 2011 20.80 100.00 Categorical UDS, ND 82 WSAP
Direct, 
Indirect
No Yes
Absolute positive, 
Absolute negative
72. Seeds 2012 u.p. 18.57 100.00 Dimensional UDS, ND 184
SST, Semantic priming 
task
Direct, 
Indirect
No Yes
Absolute positive, 
Absolute negative, 
Relative
73. Starr & Moulds, 2006 19.38 73.80 Dimensional UDS, ND 68 RIQ Direct No Yes Absolute negative
74. Teasdale et al., 1995 40.2 67.70 Categorical CD, ND 81 Sentence completion task Direct No Yes Relative
75. Teasdale et al., 1998 44.6 69.65 Categorical UDS, ND 145 Sentence completion task Direct No Yes Relative
Table 1. (continued).
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76. Torkan et al., 2014 27.61 64.10 Dimensional CD 39 SST Direct No Yes Relative
77. Van Der Does, 2005 26.40 70.83 Categorical RD, ND 48 SST Direct No Yes Relative
78. Voncken et al., 2007 39.00 57.20 Categorical CD, ND 55 IJQ Direct Yes Yes Relative
79. Watkins & Moulds, 2007 37.68 55.00 Categorical CD, RD, ND 30 SST Direct No Yes Relative 
80. Wenzlaff  &  Bates, 1998 19.70 65.55 Categorical UDS, CD, ND 90 SST Direct No Yes Relative 
81. Wenzlaff & Eysenberg, 2001 19.74 - Categorical CD, RD, ND 87 Homonym task Direct No No
Absolute positive, 
Absolute negative
82. Williams et al., 2013 44.81 76.19 Dimensional CD 63 SST, AST Direct No, Yes Yes Relative 
83. Williams et al., 2015 41.90 69.00 Dimensional CD 75 AST Direct Yes Yes Relative 
84. Wisco & Nolen-Hoeksema, 
2010.1
21.40 62.20 Categorical UDS, ND 98 IBQ Direct Yes No, Yes
Relative 
85. Wisco & Nolen-Hoeksema, 
2010.2
19.85 60.40 Categorical UDS, ND 96 IBQ Direct Yes No, Yes
Relative 
86. Wisco & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2011 21.80 61.30 Categorical UDS, ND 110 IBQ Direct Yes Yes Relative 
87. Yiend et al. 2013 43.12 72.22 Dimensional CD 36 SST Direct No Yes
Absolute positive, 
Absolute negative
Notes. u.p. = unpublished  paper; UDS = undiagnosed elevated depressive symptoms; CD = clinical depression; RD = remitted depressed; ND = non-depressed; AST = Ambiguous Scenarios/Story 
completion Test; IEM = Interpretation of Events Measure; ASSIQ = Ambiguous Social Scenario Interpretation Questionnaire; AUSD = Ambiguous/Unambiguous  Situations  Diary; BSIQ = Bodily 
Sensations Interpretation Questionnaire; CBQ = Cognitive Bias Questionnaire; IEM = Interpretation of Events Measure (Dohr, 1987); IQSD = Interpretation Questionnaire for Social Phobia and Depression; 
MIB = Measure of Interpretation Bias; SCT = Sentence Completion Task; SST = Scrambled Sentence Test; RIT = Recognition of Information Task; WSAP = Word Sentence Association Paradigm; RIQ 
= Response to Intrusions Questionnaire; IBQ = Interpretation Bias Questionnaire; IJQ = The Interpretation and Judgmental Questionnaire; IQSD = Interpretation Questionnaire for Social Phobia and 
Depression.
Table 2. Ratings for the adapted ‘Checklist for Measuring Quality’.
Item M SD
1 Study hypothesis/aim/objective described? 1.00 0.00
2 Main outcomes described in the introduction or methods? 0.97 0.16
3 Participant characteristics described? 0.92 0.27
4 Contacted participants representative? 0.87 0.33
5 Prepared participants representative? 0.86 0.35
6 Participants recruited from the same population? 0.70 0.46
7 Participants recruited over the same time? 0.97 0.16
8 Measures and experimental tasks described? 1.00 0.00
9 Main outcome measures valid and reliable? 1.00 0.00
10 Task engagement assessed? 0.33 0.50
11 Confounders described and controlled for? 1.01 0.65
12 Statistical tests appropriate? 1.00 0.00
13 Main findings described? 0.97 0.16
14 Estimates of the random variability in data main outcomes? 0.86 0.35
15 Probability values reported? 0.58 0.50
16 Withdrawals and drop-outs reported? 0.61 0.49
17 Data dredging made clear? 0.92 0.27
18 Sufficient power analysis provided? 0.08 0.27
Notes. All items have a maximum score of 1.00 except item 11 has maximum score of 2.00; 
Appendix S1 provides a full description of the individual items.
Table 3. Results overall effect size and moderators.
Ncomp g g 95%-CI I2 I2 95%-CI p
Overall effect size
All studies 87 0.72 0.62; 0.82 75 69; 79 <0.001
Outliers excludeda 74 0.74 0.66; 0.82 50 34; 62 <0.001
Moderators
Undiagnosed elevated 
depressive symptoms
21 0.66 0.47; 0.84 73 58; 82
Clinical depression 21 0.60 0.37; 0.75 68 50; 80
Clinical status of depression
Remitted depression 9 0.59 0.33; 0.86 37 0; 71
0.768
No 30 0.37 0.23; 0.52 67 52; 77 <0.001Self-referent stimuli
Yes 62 0.90 0.78; 1.01 72 65; 79
No 61 0.72 0.58; 0.85 79 73; 83 0.787Mental imagery instructions
Yes 29 0.74 0.59; 0.90 75 64; 82
Direct 76 0.88 0.77; 0.99 77 71; 81Measurement method
Indirect 20 0.04 -0.14; 0.22 59 34; 75
<0.001
Absolute positive 22 0.60 0.36; 0.85 84 76; 89
Absolute negative 43 0.58 0.40; 0.75 80 74; 85
Interpretation bias scores
Relative 44 0.85 0.70; 1.00 81 75; 86
0.043
Dimensional 41 0.86 0.73; 0.99 73 63; 80 0.004Study designb
Categorical 46 0.59 0.46; 0.71 67 55; 76
Notes. Ncomp = number of comparisons; The p-values in the last column indicate whether the difference between the ESs of the levels of the moderator 
is significant; a List of outliers: Beard et al., 2016; Bisson & Sears, 2007 – study 1a; Bos, 2005; Bowler et al., 2012; Cowden Hindash & Amir, 2012; 
D'Avanzato, 2013; Everaert et al., 2014; Goggin et al., 2011; Krantz & Hammen, 1979.1; Lawson & MacLeod, 1999; Mobius et al., 2015, study 1; 
Novovic et al., 2014; Phillips et al., 2012; b Though this moderator was significant, sensitivity analyses produced no significant differences between 
moderators for categorical and dimensional studies.
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